Vigilância governamental e a pandemia da Covid-19

Aplicativos de rastreamento de contato e privacidade de dados

Autores

  • Sofia Bordin Rolim Graduada em Direito pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul e servidora do Tribunal de Contas do Município de São Paulo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61681/revistasimetria.v1i6.25

Palavras-chave:

Proteção de dados, Vigilância governamental, Rastreamento de contato, Privacidade, Autoritarismo digital

Resumo

O presente artigo se propõe a examinar o uso de aplicativos de rastreamento de contatos durante a pandemia da Covid-19, em um contexto de vigilância governamental e autoritarismo digital crescentes. Através de uma perspectiva de proteção de dados, consideramos atributos chaves desses aplicativos, como sua arquitetura de sistema e gerenciamento de dados, examinando as principais implicações para privacidade. Exploramos brevemente alguns dos métodos de vigilância empregados ao redor do mundo e refletimos sobre suas implicações para as liberdades individuais e a democracia. Por fim, nós examinamos os resultados de uma revisão sistemática sobre a eficácia do rastreamento de contato automatizado para a prevenção da propagação do novo coronavírus.

 

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Referências

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Publicado

15/12/2020

Como Citar

Rolim, S. B. . (2020). Vigilância governamental e a pandemia da Covid-19: Aplicativos de rastreamento de contato e privacidade de dados. Revista Simetria Da Escola Superior De Gestão E Contas Do TCMSP, 1(6), 17–32. https://doi.org/10.61681/revistasimetria.v1i6.25

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