Vigilância governamental e a pandemia da Covid-19

Aplicativos de rastreamento de contato e privacidade de dados

Authors

  • Sofia Bordin Rolim Graduada em Direito pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul e servidora do Tribunal de Contas do Município de São Paulo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61681/revistasimetria.v1i6.25

Keywords:

Data protection, Government surveillance, Contact tracing, Privacy, Digital authoritarianism

Abstract

This article aims to examine the use of contact tracing apps during the Covid-19 pandemic in a context of rising government surveillance and digital authoritarianism. Through a data protection perspective, we will consider key attributes of these softwares such as system architecture and data management, and examine their main privacy implications. We briefly explore some of the surveillance methods employed around the world and reflect on its implications for individual freedoms and democracy. At last, we examine the findings of a systematic review of the effectiveness of automated contact-tracing for preventing the spread of the novel coronavirus.

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References

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Published

12/15/2020

How to Cite

Rolim, S. B. . (2020). Vigilância governamental e a pandemia da Covid-19: Aplicativos de rastreamento de contato e privacidade de dados. Revista Simetria Do Tribunal De Contas Do Município De São Paulo, 1(6), 17–32. https://doi.org/10.61681/revistasimetria.v1i6.25

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